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MARKET ACCESS AND MARKET
CONTESTABILITY: IS THE DIFFERENCE
PURELY SEMANTICS? A BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE
Shanker A. Singham*
I. EXECUTrVE SUMMARY
This Article recognizes that there are gaps in the system
of rules that govern the world trade order, where governmental
restraints on trade give rise to an anticompetitive market. We
believe that some of the solutions to these problems can be
found in the application of antitrust laws. In making this sub-
mission, we recognize the different characterization of anti-
trust and competition law as it is interpreted in the United
States and in Europe. We have analyzed restrictive trade laws
in many countries, and argued how foreign traders and inves-
tors can deal with them, using the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and other trade channels.
We advocate:
1. the introduction of antitrust concepts into WTO analysis
to ensure that foreign and local products in competition
with each other receive equivalent treatment;
2. the enforcement of national antitrust laws by strong,
independent antitrust agencies; and
3. meaningful regional institutions or processes to ensure
that there is guidance and peer review for new antitrust
authorities. Such organizations would also serve to coun-
terbalance the vested interests of domestic producers
who might otherwise wield influence with national anti-
trust agencies.
A sharp line has been drawn in legal, economic, and trade
circles between market access on the one hand, considered the
province of international trade lawyers, and market
contestability on the other, considered the province of antitrust
* Shanker A. Singham is an American lawyer and English solicitor prac-
ticing with Steel Hector & Davis, LLP in Miami, Florida.
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lawyers. A schism has developed between the two sides, and
the debate, if there is one, is frequently laced with deep levels
of hostility and mistrust. It is frequently assumed that the
interface between competition law and trade is played out
solely in the anti-dumping area, thus guaranteeing that the
subject will never be properly and carefully considered. Howev-
er, the WTO Competition Group has been warned of the sub-
ject of anti-dumping and therefore must come face to face with
those other areas which warrant consideration at the interface
of trade and competition. Clearly the negative impact of the
interface of many different competition policies on global trade
is one of the subjects being considered. Approximately seventy
countries now have competition laws,1 and these often have
very different rules and different merger notification require-
ments. Their interface presents a considerable barrier to busi-
ness, particularly in the merger notification area.
There is another area, however, that competition experts
could profitably explore with their trade counterparts. Many
countries retain trade restrictive legislation, which acts as a
non-tariff barrier to trade, but which might not be easily at-
tacked using existing WTO rules. The reason is that most of
the WTO rules require some element of favoritism or protec-
tion of domestic production in order for the trade rules to ap-
ply. Antitrust principles by and large do not recognize nation-
ality, and focus entirely on a particular private conduct and its
effect on price. However, we must recognize that there is legis-
lation which positively mandates private anti-competitive con-
duct, which would be a violation of the competition law of most
countries. We must also recognize that antitrust principles
which have been honed by over one hundred years of caselaw
in the United States may be very usefully included in WTO
analysis, which has in the past been criticized as woolly and
obscure. As the WTO (especially at the level of Appellate Body
decision-making) develops its own body of law, which can be
used to predict how its rules will be applied, introduction of
some of these concepts where relevant would be very useful in
clarifying the application of WTO agreements.
This Article will focus on some of the areas where we ar-
1. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION POLICY 290, U.N. Sales No. E.97.II.D.10 (1997).
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gue competition rules could be a useful supplement to interpre-
tation of the WTO agreements, and where application of com-
petition law by national governments could assist in disman-
tling the network of public sector restraints which adversely
affect the ability of new entrants to enter markets in a way
that is profitable in the long term. This last proposal is not
new. It has been attempted before in the first generation of
competition laws of the countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope as they embraced free market reforms:
In at least one respect the competition laws of many
transition countries were unique. They contained a fourth
"substantive" violation in addition to abuse of dominance,
restrictive agreements and merger control: anticompetitive
acts by bodies of government. To be sure, most competition
laws apply either explicitly or implicitly to entrepreneurial
conduct by government, but these provisions in transition
country laws by their terms applied to regulatory and gover-
nance functions as well. It is not difficult to understand the
historical basis for such provisions. Bodies of government at
all levels had been the principal, if not the only, economic
actors under central planning. Old habits would die hard. It
was considered necessary to explicitly forbid interference by
these bodies with the new discipline of the marketplace.'
It is not just the countries that are moving away from
centrally planned economies that maintain restrictive trade
laws, and these principles are very important to consider for
non-transition countries also. Many countries maintain laws as
a result of a business environment which either tolerates anti-
competitive practices or actually mandates such practices
through anticompetitive legislation. This is particularly true of
developing and semi-industrialized countries, where anticom-
petitive practices and governmental restraints have been the
very reason many of these economies have not been able to
develop. These laws were not, generally, designed to protect
any particular domestic industry. Instead, the problem with
these laws is that they distort the market and are related to
the contestability of markets.
Article 7 of the competition law of the Russian Federation
2. John Clark, Restraints by Regional and Local Governments on Competition:
Lessons From Transition Countries, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 364-65 (1999).
339
BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXV:2
is a good example of precisely this type of legislation.' Article
7 states that:
Federal organs of executive power, organs of executive power
of RF [Russian Federation] subjects, and organs of local self-
government shall be prohibited from issuing acts and/or per-
forming actions restricting the independence of business
persons and creating discriminatory or, conversely, favorable
conditions for the activity of individual business persons,
where such acts or actions have resulted or may result in
restraint of competition and/or infringement upon the inter-
ests of business persons or individuals .... '
Article 7 prohibits unilateral anticompetitive acts by gov-
ernmental bodies, including enacting or enforcing anticompeti-
tive legislation.5 Article 6 of the Ukrainian competition law
prohibits, inter alia, granting discriminatory tax benefits to
particular enterprises.6 Many other transition countries have
had or continue to have such provisions.'
Anecdotal evidence suggests, according to the Clark Essay,
that there were a substantial number of cases and enforcement
actions, and that these laws were useful tools in reducing pub-
3. Law on Competition and Limiting Monopolistic Activities on Commodity
Markets, Mar. 22, 1991, as amended May 25, 1995, art. 7 (Russ.), translated in
RUSSIA & THE REPUBLICS LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota
eds., 1999).
4. Id.
5. See Clark, supra note 2, at 364.
6. Law on Containing Monopolies and Preventing Unfair Competition in Busi-
ness Activities, Feb. 18, 1992, art. 6 (Ukr.), translated in RUSSIA & THE REPUB-
LICS LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1999).
7. These include: Georgia, On Monopoly Activity and Competition, June 25,
1996, ch. 5 arts. 16-26 (Geor.); Hungary (prior to its amendment in 1997), Act No.
LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices, June
25, 1996, ch. 8 art. 63 (Hung.); Slovakia, Law on the Protection of Economic Com-
petition, July 8, 1994, art. 18 (Slovk.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE-
AN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998); Bulgaria, Protection of Compe-
tition Act, May 2, 1991, art. 4 (Bulg.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE-
AN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998); Romania, Law on Unfair Com-
petition, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 9 (Rem.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN
LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998); Lithuania, Law on Competition,
Sept. 15, 1992, art. 6 (Lith.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL
MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1999); Latvia, Law on Competition, June 18,
1997, arts. 5-14 (Lat.); and, Estonia, Law on Competition, July 7, 1993, art. 2
(Est.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav
Pechota ed., 1998).
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lic sector restraints.8 Many of the early cases there focused on
regulatory discrimination, especially where the government
owned assets of entities that were being regulated (for example
in the energy and telecommunications sectors).9 There are in-
teresting parallels here with the newly privatized telecommu-
nications sectors in Latin America in particular, as will be
specifically referred to in a case study later in this Article.
So what can be done to deal with these practices where
market entry and contestability are adversely affected by
anticompetitive law? We believe that the issues of access and
contestability are intractably interrelated, and the ability to
access a market is completely vitiated if, once entered, the
market is not competitive. This Article is intended to be a brief
summary of these experiences and a review of how the interna-
tional trade rules affect these issues. It will also focus on sev-
eral particular kinds of objectionable trade practices and dis-
cuss how more vigorous enforcement of competition policy and
introduction of competition concepts into WTO Agreement
enforcement might remedy the problems.
II. DISCRIMINATORY TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRODUCTS
Many countries, particularly though not exclusively in
emerging markets, have tax regimes that unfairly discriminate
against foreign-sourced products in favor of locally produced
products. Sometimes the discrimination is carefully hidden,
and not obvious from the surface of the law. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,'0 now the WTO Agree-
ment" (GATT 1994), attempts to provide protection against
this type of discrimination. However, broadly speaking, these
protections apply only when the two products for which differ-
ent tax treatment applies are "like products." Sometimes this
discriminatory tax is so severe that it results in vastly differ-
8. Clark, supra note 2, at 367.
9. Id.
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
11. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (GATT 1947 was incorporated
into the WTO as GATT 1994 in Annex IA to the WTO Agreement) [hereinafter
GATT 19941.
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ent retail pricing between the domestic and imported product.
This large price differential is then used as evidence that the
products are not "like products" protected from discriminatory
tariffs under the GATT 1994.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the GATT 199412 should
prevent these discriminatory situations, but they often fail.
Article 111.2 of the GATT 1994 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party import-
ed into the territory of any other contracting party shall not
be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other in-
ternal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no con-
tracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a man-
ner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.13
Article III.1 of the GATT 1994 provides:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to af-
ford protection to domestic production.14
Notwithstanding these clear rules, problems frequently
arise when trying to establish that Article 111.2 of the GATT
1994 applies to a particularly discriminatory tax statute, either
at a national or local level.
Government price supports for inputs sometimes undercut
the GATT's protections against discriminatory tariffs on "like
products." These price supports are a hidden tariff on identical
imported products. They also skew the analysis of whether
12. Id. art. 111.1-2.
13. Id. art. 111.2.
14. Id. art. III.1. Article III, paragraph 1 provides that internal taxes by local
governments and authorities are subject to Article XXIV. Id. Article XXIV.12 pro-
vides that "[elach contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may
be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories." Id. art.
XXlV.12.
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substantially similar products are "like products" under the
GATT 1994. Prices and consumer preferences are so tilted in
favor of the domestic product that substantially similar prod-
ucts are found not to be "like products." Revenues that the
government loses at the one end by providing price supports to
domestic inputs are recovered in the form of tariffs on import-
ed products no longer protected by the GATT 1994.
The determination of whether products are "like products"
is flawed and based on incorrect criteria. The WTO determines
which products are "like products" in the following way:
1. The initial determination appears to be whether the
products are "similar or identical."
2. Certain factors may be considered, e.g., product's end-
uses, consumers' tastes and habits, product's properties,
nature, quality, and tariff classification. 5
In the Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages6 case, the
Panel found that the favored Japanese spirit shochu and for-
eign-imported vodka were "like products" and were therefore
entitled to equivalent tax treatment, applying the first sen-
tence of Article III.2."7 However, whiskey, gin, rum, brandy,
genever, and certain liqueurs were found not to be "like prod-
ucts" under the GATT 1994 test. 8 The Panel found that they
were "directly competitive or substitutable" 9 products and
that differential tax treatment of shochu, on the one hand, and
the other spirits, on the other, was a violation of the second
sentence of Article 111.2 because this differential treatment was
designed "so as to afford protection to domestic production."'
15. See World Trade Organization Panel Report on United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274, 294.
16. World Trade Organization Panel Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Bev-
erages, July 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 406720 [hereinafter Japan Panel].
17. Id. at 114.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 118. The annexed interpretive note to the GATT 1994 art. 111.2
states:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph
2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the sec-
ond sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on
the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly com-
petitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.
GATT 1994, supra note 11, ad art. III para. 2.
20. Japan Panel, supra note 16, at 121 (quoting the GATT 1994, supra note
343
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In other words, the Panel said that Article 111.2 of the
GATT 1994 was violated if there was different tax treatment
for "like products," without more, but that a violation of Article
111.2 could only be found for the broader class of "directly com-
petitive or substitutable products" if the differential tax was
applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.2
The Panel went a long way in applying (broadly) an anti-
trust product market analysis to identify which products were
directly competitive or substitutable. The Japan Panel used a
demand-side substitution analysis, using cross-elasticities of
demand to determine whether products were "directly competi-
tive or substitutable."22
The Japan Panel decision was significant because it moved
away from the reasoning employed by earlier GATT panels,
most significantly in the U.S.-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages decision.' There, the GATT Panel said that in
order for products to be "like products," the aim of the differen-
tial taxation had to be to protect domestic production. This was
the "aim and effect test," which the Japan Panel overruled.
Instead, the Japan Panel replaced this by saying that a viola-
tion of Article 111.2 of the GATT 1994 could be shown if "like
products" were receiving differential tax treatment, or if "di-
rectly competitive or substitutable products" were receiving dif-
ferential tax treatment, and the tax was applied so as to favor
domestic production.24 The Japan decision implies that the
distinction between "like products" and "directly competitive or
substitutable" products is less important for Article 111.2 analy-
sis because there is Article 111.2 protection for "like products"
and also for "directly competitive or substitutable products."2"
We suggest that use of supply and demand substitution
analysis commonly used in defining relevant markets for anti-
trust purposes, if added to the other factors already used in
determining what constitutes "like products" (as well as direct-
ly competitive and substitutable products) would greatly in-
crease the likelihood that the GATT's purposes will be realized,
11, art. III.1)
21. See id. at 118.
22. Id. at 117.
23. GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S.-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993).
24. Japan Panel, supra note 16, at 110-11.
25. Id. at 111-12.
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and give much needed predictability to GATT analysis. It must
be recognized, of course, that the analysis should take into
account the effect of the unequal taxation, and so should in-
clude other non-price factors as well.
If a small but significant increase in the price of one prod-
uct will cause consumers to shift to another product, then both
products are in the same market and should be considered
"like products" for these purposes. Supply side factors should
also be important when considering whether two products
should be considered "like products." If a supplier of one prod-
uct could easily "re-tool" to become a supplier of the other, then
that would be evidence that the two products are like products.
These economic concepts, commonly employed in antitrust
analysis, would help ensure that tariffs on imported products
and price supports for domestic inputs would not undercut the
competitive relationship between imported and local products
that the GATT 1994 was intended to protect. In the Kore-
an-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body
affirmed much of what was said in the Japan case but rejected
a pure product market analysis, instead saying that cross-elas-
ticity of demand was not the exclusive or decisive factor.26
However, the Appellate Body also acknowledged that potential
competition had to be considered, especially "where there
[were] regulatory barriers to trade or to competition ....""
The Appellate Body rejected the notion that products were
not in competition if the protective tax effectively put them in
different price brackets for consumers.28 This case clarified
that when the purpose of a tax is to decrease competition, the
resulting lack of competition cannot be used as a defense to an
Article 111.2 claim, as this would defeat the purpose of the
WTO. Regarding the question of affording protection to domes-
tic products, the case confirmed the Japan ruling, and indicat-
ed that massive differences in the level of taxation could be
evidence of protection to domestic products.29
A second difficulty has come to our attention. The GATT
26. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on Korea-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, Jan. 18, 1999, WTO Doc. WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R
(visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.wto.orgwto/dispute/7085.pdf>.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 35.
29. See id.
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1994 applies only to discrimination resulting from a "national"
measure. Increasingly, however, discriminatory tax regimes
are issued by individual states, provincial, or local govern-
ments. If what exists is a patchwork quilt of state or provincial
regulations that discriminate against foreign products and are
merely tolerated by the national government, then it is diffi-
cult to maintain an Article III case, notwithstanding the horta-
tory recommendation of Article III, paragraph 1 of the notes
and supplementary provisions of the GATT 1994, which forces
contracting parties to comply with Article XXIV.12 of the
GATT 1994.30 This Article states that contracting parties
must use reasonable measures to make local and state govern-
mental activity GATT compliant.3
A third difficulty is proving that discriminatory tax mea-
sures are intended to protect domestic industries against for-
eign rivals.12 Many tax regimes that discriminate against im-
ports as a side-effect were not designed for the purpose of ben-
efitting a particular domestic industry against foreign rivals.33
Rather, these tax regimes may be intended to benefit a local
industry that does not directly compete with foreign rivals.
Exactly what level of protection should be afforded to do-
mestic products is a vexing question in WTO analysis. In Euro-
pean Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas4 (Bananas V), the European Communi-
ty unsuccessfully argued that it must be shown that the policy
measure was designed to afford protection to domestic prod-
ucts.35 The Appellate Body overruled the "aims and effects"
test once and for all, and further reaffirmed the proposition ad-
vanced in the Japan decision, requiring an examination of "the
underlying criteria used in a particular ... measure, its struc-
ture, and its overall application to ascertain whether it is ap-
plied in a way that affords protection to domestic products."36
30. GATT 1994, supra note 11, ad art. III para. 1.
31. GATT 1994, supra note 11, art. XXIV.12.
32. See Japan Panel, supra note 16, at 109.
33. See id. at 111.
34. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on European Communi-
ties-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Sept. 9, 1997,
4 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 63 (Sept. 1, 1997-Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Banan-
as IV].
35. Id. at 124, 134, 136.
36. Id. at 93.
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The Bananas IV Appellate Body also stated that "the protec-
tive application of a measure can most often be discerned from
the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of the
measure."
37
We suggest that discriminatory tax measures, otherwise
outside the ambit of the GATT 1994, should be attacked using
competition concepts such as those incorporated in the Treaty
Establishing the European Community" (EC Treaty). A tax
break given to local industry and not given to foreign suppliers
of competitive products is nothing more than a "state aid" as
those terms are used in Article 92 of Treaty on European Un-
ion,39 and should be prohibited as they are by Article 92.
Article 92 provides that:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by
a Member-State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member-
States, be incompatible with the common market."
Certain exemptions are granted to promote the economic
development of very poor areas, or in line with other European
Union objectives. 4 But, generally speaking, if a country in the
European Union adopted a discriminatory tax regime, it would
be a clear violation of Article 92 of the EC Treaty with conse-
quent redress available for affected private entities.
Indeed, Article 95 of the EC Treaty states that:
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the
products of other Member States any internal taxation of any
kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on simi-
lar domestic products. Furthermore, no Member State shall
impose on the products of other Member States any internal
37. Id. at 129.
38. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMiutNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY], amended by
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 11992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEUI. The TEU amended the EC
TREATY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT,
O.J. (L 169), 119871 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987).
39. TEU, supra note 38, art. 92.
40. Id.
41. See id.
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taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to
other products.42
Hence, discriminatory tax laws (direct or indirect) are viola-
tions of the EC Treaty.
We propose that other regional trade agreements have
rules similar to those of the EC Treaty which could assist us in
dealing with the indirect ways in which governments disadvan-
tage foreign rivals. Only once rules are in place at a regional
level, might we proceed to have such rules in the WTO context
as well. We recommend that some of the regional trading areas
currently being negotiated such as the FTAA, 41 MERC-
OSUR," and APEC45 incorporate some element of a competi-
tion policy that would enable either their own national com-
petition authorities and/or a broader regional authority to deal
with national laws that clearly distort the market in a particu-
lar country or in the region itself. National antitrust authori-
ties, of course, face significant pressure from political forces
and will need some help in tackling the more politically sensi-
tive issues, of which local discriminatory taxation is a prime
example. Unless a regional authority provides specific guidance
at an institutional level, it is unlikely that the impetus will
come solely from within the country for the reasons stated
above. Many of the local interests that are protected under the
law have a great deal of political power. A mandate given by
regional trade agreements can give credibility to national anti-
trust agencies seeking to eliminate discriminatory tax laws.
The only realistic way of dealing with this problem is to
ensure that within regional trade agreements with competition
provisions, there is a mechanism for analyzing and striking
down public sector restraints. Enhanced communication be-
tween antitrust officials will certainly not be enough.
42. EC TREATY, supra note 38, art. 95.
43. See Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean, May 10,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 792.
44. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Repub-
lic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay, (MERCOSUR), Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041.
45. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] Forum: Osaka Action Agen-
da on Implementation of the Bogor Declaration, Nov. 19, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1111.
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III. DEALER PROTECTION STATUTES
WTO resolution of public sector restraint disputes is also
difficult in the area of dealer protection statutes. Although
dealer protection statutes vary, common themes run through
many if not all of them. Many local dealer protection statutes
provide for substantial "termination indemnities" in the event
that an agreement with a local distributor is terminated by a
foreign supplier. In addition, dealer protection statutes often
provide for onerous procedures whereby local dealers may be
terminated. Once an exclusive distribution agreement is en-
tered, dealer protection statutes frequently mandate agree-
ments of an indefinite duration. These conditions are wholly
intolerable for foreign suppliers. These laws arguably violate
Article III.4 of the GATT 1994, and Articles II, XVI, and XVII
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services46 (GATS). It is
difficult, however, to maintain WTO cases against these laws.
The first problem is with the GATT 1994 Article III.4
requirement that the law be connected, in some way, with
favoring local production.4" Of course, that is not the main
focus of the law. The dealer protection statutes are designed to
protect the local distribution interests in the country. The ef-
fect of the law is to insulate the distribution sector from com-
petition or even the threat of competition. This leads to distrib-
utors maintaining large profit margins and high prices for
consumers. Countries that have such laws often have higher
product prices than countries which do not have such laws. In
certain industries, the failure of the distribution sector means
that much needed products, frequently in poor countries, are
kept from reaching the poorest people.
Another problem is that the current rules on accession to
the GATS require WTO Members to sign onto a positive series
of commitments rather than apply to be exempted from certain
service sectors (as would be required under NAFTA). Many of
the countries which have signed up to the GATS have not
signed up to the distribution services commitments at all.
In Canada-Measures Concerning Periodicals," an argu-
46. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28; 33 I.L.M. 1167.
47. GATT 1994, supra note 11, art. III.4.
48. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on Canada-Certain
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ment was made that the GATT 1994 could not apply to mea-
sures whose application affects both goods and services. " The
decision clearly states that obligations under the GATT 1994
and the GATS can coexist and one does not automatically
override the other.50 Analyzing a tax on Canadian periodicals,
the test was to determine whether the tax by its structure and
design was a tax on goods or a tax on services. Since it was the
supplier of goods that suffered the tax, and not the provider of
advertising services, the GATT 1994 was found to apply. 1
Both Canada-Measures Concerning Periodicals and Bananas
IV state that GATT 1994 and GATS commitments must be
overlapping to avoid eroding service commitments made in the
goods distribution sector.52
If these laws were enacted in countries with strong and
well-enforced competition laws, they would raise serious com-
petitive concerns, and the activities of the distributors might
attract the attention of competition regulators. In many of
these countries, multinationals pay large sums of money to buy
out local distributors for amounts inflated by the threat of the
application of the termination indemnities by the local courts.
These multinationals, in turn, are forced to pass these inflated
costs on to consumers. In other cases where there is no buy-
out, the distributors' high profit margin is passed directly onto
consumers.
Article III.4 of the GATT 1994 should be applicable to
these cases. Article III.4 states that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party import-
ed into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application
of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of
Measures Concerning Periodicals, June 30, 1997, 3 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 1
(June 1, 1997-Aug. 31, 1997).
49. See id. at 8.
50. See id. at 14.
51. See id. at 13.
52. Id. at 15; Bananas IV, supra note 34, at 65.
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transport and not on the nationality of the product.53
Article III.4 of the GATT 1994 does not refer to the horta-
tory provisions of Article III.1 as Article 111.2 does in its second
sentence.M This suggests that there is less of a requirement
to show favoring of national production in making an Article
111.2 claim. The Panel in European Communities-Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas" said that
this was determined according to whether the "design, the
architecture, and the revealing structure of the measure" sug-
gests a protective application.56 However, in Bananas IV, the
Appellate Body took issue with the Panel's reasoning and
pointed to the fact that Article III.1 informed the first and
second sentences of Article 111.2 in different ways, as it had
made clear in its Japan ruling. Applying this logic to Article
III.4, the Appellate Body stated that:
The same reasoning must be applied to the interpretation of
Article III:4. Article III:4 does not specifically refer to Article
III:l. Therefore, a determination of whether there has been a
violation of Article III:4 does not require a separate consider-
ation of whether a measure "afford[s] protection to domestic
production.""
After the Japan Panel and the Bananas IV Appellate Body
rulings, the law seems clear enough. All that is needed to es-
tablish an Article III.4 violation is differential treatment be-
tween like products based on nationality. It remains to be seen
how future panels and governments will interpret these provi-
sions in vigorously pursuing examples of restrictive laws that
violate Article III.4. However, national governments frequently
argue that some element of the favoring of national production
needs to be shown, contrary to what now appears to be the
WTO law on the subject.
There are reasons why making such a stipulation not only
53. GATT 1994, supra note 11, art. 111.4.
54. Id. arts. 111.1-2, III.4.
55. World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on European Communi-
ties-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, May 22, 1997,
2 BERNAN'S ANNOTATED REP. 93 (Feb. 26, 1997-May 31, 1997).
56. Id. at 437.
57. Bananas IV, supra note 34, at 130.
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flies in the face of WTO law but also violates the spirit of Arti-
cle III.4 as well. The effect of dealer protection laws, just as is
the case with many trade restrictive laws, is not necessarily to
build up a national competitive industry but simply to extract
as much as possible from foreign suppliers and to develop an
industry of dealers or distributors of foreign supplier's prod-
ucts. The purpose of the trade rules themselves is to ensure
that by treating foreign suppliers the same as local suppliers,
foreign trade will be encouraged, and this will significantly
enhance the economic development of the countries involved.
Insofar as these laws are maintained by developing countries
there is even more urgency in dealing with them. They contrib-
ute directly to the greater disparities in wealth between a
privileged few and the poor majority by increasing consumer
price and reducing choice by limiting the supply of foreign
products to the country. This is a significant reason why devel-
oping countries' economic growth has been held back. These
laws are another example of legislation which violates both
trade rules and competition principles. It is useful at this point
to consider the potential application of competition principles
to these laws and the private arrangements which they man-
date.
Although these laws violate the spirit of the GATT 1994
Article III.4, it is sometimes difficult to show that the effect is
to favor local production (although this is sometimes an ancil-
lary result). The effect of the law is to favor local distributors.
In sectors where there is no domestic industry, particularly
true in developing countries, there is no Article III cause of
action. Again, European competition law is useful here:
Article 90 of the EC Treaty"8 states that:
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which
member-States grant special or exclusive rights, member-
States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure
contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to
those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.9
Article 7 provides that: "any discrimination on the grounds of
nationality shall hereby be prohibited."0
58. EC TREATY, supra note 38, art. 90.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
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The dealer protection statutes with their inherent discrim-
ination against foreign suppliers would be clear violations of
the principles enshrined in Article 90 of the EC Treaty.
In addition, those agreements that mandate exclusive
relationships of indefinite duration for an entire national mar-
ket or are terminable only on the payment of a penalty are
vertical restraints on trade that would violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act6' or Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.62 Under
most countries' antitrust or competition systems such agree-
ments would be deemed uncompetitive and struck down. The
only difference is that in many countries where these agree-
ments abound, they do so because of governmental regulation
and not purely as a result of private behavior.
We maintain that here again some form of regional compe-
tition process with a clear mandate from its member states
would be a very useful part of regional trade agreements in-
tended to eliminate discriminatory national trade barriers.
A. Frequent Defenses
Attempts to remove trade barriers are naturally resisted
by powerful vested interests, especially in developing and semi-
industrialized countries. Many countries rely on a number of
defenses to prevent WTO Rules being used against them. One
defensive weapon used frequently is GATT 1994 Article XII
and XVIII.B-Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Pay-
ments.63 Under Article XII, a country may impose import re-
strictions in order to safeguard its external financial position
and its balance of payments." However, such import restric-
tions must not exceed those necessary to forestall the immi-
nent threat of a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or
achieve a reasonable rate of return on those reserves. Any such
restrictions must be progressively relaxed, as conditions im-
prove. They should also be eliminated when they can no longer
be justified under Article XII and Article XVIII.65
Article XII is the only provision available for developed
61. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
62. EC TREATY, supra note 38, art. 85.
63. GATT 1994, supra note 11, arts. XII, XVIII.B.
64. Id. art. XII.
65. Id. art. XII, XVIII.
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countries and allows import restrictions only to the extent
necessary either to forestall an imminent threat of, or to stop
an imminent decline in, its reserves--or to rebuild reserves
that are very low.66 Article XVIII.B is available to developing
countries only. It relaxes these obligations slightly and says
that reserves must be inadequate, and a threat need not be
imminent for the Balance of Payments defense to be applica-
ble.6" The Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provi-
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 199468
(Understanding) limits the scope of the defense. Members must
announce publicly their schedules for phasing out restrictive
import measures or provide justification if this is not possible.
Restrictions may only be applied to control the general level of
imports. The Understanding also makes it clear that "essential
products" may be excluded from these sectors. 9
Contracting parties which apply Article XVIII restrictions
must not apply those restrictions in such a way as to prevent
the importation of goods in minimum commercial quantities, so
as not to disturb regular channels of trade. These negotiations
are carried out in the Committee on Balance of Payments
Restrictions which makes an assessment of Article XVIII com-
pliance. However, the efficacy of this defense has been called
into question after the WTO Panel decision in In-
dia-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Tex-
tile and Industrial Products.7 ° In the WTO Panel decision,
India's tariff restrictions and non-tariff barriers (particularly
its import licensing program) were attacked by the U.S. as
being a WTO violation, notwithstanding India's reliance on the
Article XII and XVIII defense. The WTO Panel found that
India's Balance of Payments did not merit continued use of
WTO-violative import licensing rules, relying in part on the
IMF's testimony to the Committee on Balance of Payments
that India's reserves were not inadequate or threatened by a
serious decline. The case was important because it covered all
66. Id. art. XII.
67. See id. art. XVIII.B.
68. GATT Secretariat, Understanding on the Balance of Payments Provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1158, 1158 (1994).
69. Id. at 1159.
70. World Trade Organization Panel Report on India-Quantitative Restrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Apr. 6, 1999,
WT/DS90/R, (visited Aug. 16, 1999) <httpJ/www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>.
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aspects of agricultural and industrial goods and was the first
time that India's Balance of Payments defense had not suc-
ceeded in protecting its WTO-violative import licensing re-
gime. 7 1
The WTO Panel made some important comments about
the nature of the defense. The Panel ruled that balance of
payments compliance under the Balance of Payments Commit-
tee under Article XII or XVIII, or under the dispute resolution
procedures of Article XXIII were all possible, thus giving fu-
ture WTO panels the chance to rule on whether a country's
balance of payment restrictions satisfy the WTO rules." The
Panel specifically ruled that WTO Panels could determine
whether a balance of payments situation justified a particular
measure." The Panel also responded to India's claim that it
did not have jurisdiction over non-legal, technical issues by
stating that it could consult experts to make such determina-
tions, and this was in fact what it regularly did in a number of
areas.74 Clearly the Balance of Payments Committee would
continue to play such an "expert role."
Regarding the burden of proof, the WTO Panel suggested
that where a complaining party has established a prima facie
case, the burden of proof is on the defendant to raise a rebutta-
ble presumption that an affirmative defense, such as the Bal-
ance of Payments defense, applies. 75 The complainant will fail
if it does not raise enough evidence to rebut the presumption.
However, the Panel also stated that the complainant cannot
limit itself to stating its claim if the Balance of Payments pro-
visions of the WTO Agreements have already been invoked.76
It is then required to present a prima facie case that the de-
fense is not justified. If it does so, the defendant would then
have to respond to rebut that claim. It is not entirely clear how
future panels will apply these evidentiary rules, but it is some-
thing of a clarification of the somewhat murky way in which
former GATT panels carried out their evidential decision-mak-
ing.
71. See id. at 174.
72. See id. at 136.
73. See id. at 153.
74. See id. at 151.
75. See id. at 160.
76. See id.
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Another much quoted defense is the Differential and More
Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries." In particular, paragraph 6 states:
Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the
particular development, financial and trade needs of the
least-developed countries, the developed countries shall exer-
cise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contri-
butions for commitments made by them to reduce or remove
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, and
the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make
concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the
recognition of their particular situation and problems."8
However, we must be careful in considering this piece of
GATT law which should not be used to give carte blanche to
developing countries to engage in precisely the type of protec-
tionism which has prolonged their economic difficulties. Far
from resisting attempts to open markets to foreign trade and
investment, there is a greater urgency for transition and devel-
oping countries to ensure that their markets are open and
their trading regimes liberal. The GATT decision should not
stand in the way of such development.
Another method which is used by countries to protect
conduct which would otherwise be a violation of the GATT
1994 is the application of waivers to provisions of the WTO
Agreements which are given in the case of less-developed coun-
tries. 9 Reliance on waivers has been limited after the Under-
standing in Respect of Waivers of Obligations Under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 19940 (Understanding
on Waivers) whereby waivers can only be granted or extended
if the Member State declares the specific policy objective which
the waiver is intended to achieve and the reasons why the
Member cannot achieve its policy objectives in compliance with
GATT 1994. The Understanding on Waivers also specifically
states that Article XXIII dispute resolution may be invoked by
77. Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-
pation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203
(1980).
78. Id. at 204.
79. See Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligation Under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1163.
80. Id.
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Members who consider that the terms and conditions of a
waiver are not being complied with, or that it is nullifying or
impairing their benefits which have been previously agreed to
in the context of a trade agreement.8'
IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND REGULATORY
AGENCIES
The final area that we are using as an example of the
tension between trade and competition law is the area of regu-
lation of the newly privatized utilities, and the interaction
between national regulatory authorities and national antitrust
authorities. As an example, we highlight difficulties raised
between the Federal Competition Commission (CFC) in Mexico
and the sectoral regulatory agencies, in particular COFETEL,
the telecommunications regulatory agency.
A. Summary of Mexican Commitments under Basic
Telecommunications Agreement
Mexico signed onto the Basic Telecommunications Agree-
ment82 and did not have any exceptions to the national treat-
ment provisions. Mexico also specifically signed up to the Ref-
erence Paper83 associated with the Basic Telecommunications
Agreement. The Reference Paper provides for competitive safe-
guards to prevent anticompetitive practices in the telecommu-
nications industry.8 Certain practices are specifically preclud-
ed, in particular:
* not making available to other services suppliers on a
timely basis technical information about essential facil-
ities and commercially relevant information which are
necessary for them to provide services;85
Sinterconnection... [is also to] be ensured at any techni-
cally feasible point in the network. Such interconnec-
81. Id.
82. GATS Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, Apr. 30,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 365.
83. Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 30,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 366.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 367.
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tion... [must be] non-discriminatory... [at rates] no
less favorable than that provided for its own like servic-
es ....86
The CFC was ignored when it ruled that the dominant
carrier, Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex) was dominant within the
meaning of Mexican competition law, and hence eligible for
increased regulatory controls."7 COFETEL, the Mexican tele-
communications regulator ignored the ruling of the CFC and
has not effectively responded to it."s It will be important for
national competition commissions to actually have teeth and to
ensure that they are not merely trumped by the industry regu-
latory agency, where the chances of regulatory capture are
much higher.
It will also be important for sectoral regulators to apply
competition principles in their rulings, as specifically mandat-
ed in the Reference Paper, to which Mexico has recently com-
mitted itself. The recent actions by COFETEL indicate that
this is not the case. In a workshop sponsored by the OECD and
the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, 9 the Korean competi-
tion agency claimed to have the power to intervene in the ac-
tivities of the regulatory agency to ensure that the dominant
position is not abused."
B. Inter-Relationship Between COFETEL and CFC
The CFC has twice found Telmex to be the dominant carri-
er and to possess market power in five relevant markets: inter-
national long-distance, domestic long-distance, basic local ser-
vices, access (interconnection), and interurban transport."
This ruling should have subjected Telmex to increased regula-
tion, but COFETEL has not done anything substantive. Other
complaints have also been brought by Telmex's competitors,
86. Id. at 368.
87. See Report of the Comision Federal de Comperencia [on file with author].
88. See id.
89. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE
OF THE COMPETITION AGENCY IN REGULATORY REFORM (1997).
90. See id. at 85. See the remarks of Byong-Kyun Kim, Standing Commission-
er of Korea's Fair Trade Commission. Id. at 36, 42, 84-86.
91. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CHAP-
TER 6: REGULATORY REFORM IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: MEXICO 9
(1999) [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM].
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including complaints about Telmex's discriminatory treatment
of the billing and collection services and private digital services
provided to other concessionaires.2 A 1997 complaint con-
cerned Telmex's high charges for dedicated customer access
lines provided to a competitor, Alestra, and a 1997 complaint
concerned Telmex's de facto exclusive provision of international
800 services in Mexico.
Additionally, competition in the local telephone market
should have begun this year. However, one new entrant has
already complained about Telmex's settlement procedures. In
its submission to the U.S. Trade Representative under section
1377 of the Trade Act, Megacable Comunicaciones de Mexico
(MCM) claimed that Telmex had refused to meet to discuss
settlement, and COFETEL had taken several months to re-
solve the dispute while MCM was charged considerably more
than a cost-based settlement rate. Telmex's current prices are
regulated by the terms of a 1990 Telmex concession." Howev-
er, it is clear that COFETEL's regulatory power over Telmex
prices was "subject to a finding by the competition authority
that a carrier possessed significant market power"4 (i.e., was
dominant within the meaning of Mexican competition law).
The 1997 CFC decision states quite clearly that Telmex is
dominant in five markets. 5 Yet Telmex's prices continue to be
regulated by the 1990 Telmex Concession. The price cap meth-
odology used allows the potential for anticompetitive cross-
subsidization, in contravention of the competition safeguards
in the Reference Paper and general competition principles. The
problem stems from the fact that there is the potential for
cross-subsidization, which enables Telmex to recoup losses
brought about through potentially predatory pricing in the long
distance segment by increased prices in the local segment
where there is inadequate competition. Since the very high
surcharges that new entrants had to pay Telmex (58% sur-
charge on the interconnection rate) went into Telmex's general
revenues and could easily be used for any purpose, it appears
that there are no or certainly very limited competitive safe-
guards.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 22.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 9.
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A recent OECD study on telecommunications regulation in
Mexico illustrates that Telmex has behaved exactly as a domi-
nant carrier could be expected to behave under these circum-
stances.96 When rivals increased market share to 30%, Telmex
rapidly cut prices to regain 10% of the long distance market.97
Hence, the 30% market share of the rivals was short-lived
(approximately three to five months).98 This was possible be-
cause Telmex had the potential to recoup lost revenues by
increasing local market prices.
Further, CFC has not provided any solution to the problem
of dominance that it set out in its November 1997 decision.
This problem arises because CFC is not empowered to make
these decisions. It should have the power to ensure that domi-
nant entities adhere to the competition rules. CFC should have
more of a role in setting out all possible remedies to address
the dominance problems in the Mexican market. As long as
CFC cannot design remedies for competition abuses in the
telecommunications sector, the competitive safeguards which
Mexico has already committed to in the Reference Paper will
remain nothing more than hot air.
There is also evidence that long distance price reduction
has simply been accompanied by local price increases. Remark-
ably, Telmex's revenues have remained fairly constant despite
a significant decrease in long distance prices. Prices for a com-
plete basket of services in Mexico are approximately three
times the OECD average.99 Many of Telmex's arguments re-
late to the Universal Service commitments in the Reference
Paper. However, Mexico appears to have lost ground since the
1990 Concession in its penetration rates. Mexico has only 10
access lines per 100 inhabitants, compared with the next low-
est OECD country, Poland, with 20.1"' Despite Telmex and
COFETEL's protestations, there is no evidence that this is
improving.
This illustrates that the CFC in Mexico is not able to oper-
ate in the way that was envisaged at its inception. There are
96. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM, supra note 91, at 30.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1998-1999: MEXICO 128 (1999).
100. See id. at 127-28.
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severe problems in implementation of Mexico's WTO Commit-
ments, and in particular the competition safeguards which are
mandated in the Reference Paper.
There is always tension between industry regulators and
antitrust authorities, but the Mexican situation seems ex-
treme. None of Mexico's commitments, competition safeguards,
or other commitments are currently being honored and this
could be a systemic fault in the manner in which the CFC is
able to operate. The problem arises out of a weakness in the
ability of the national competition agency to issue rulings that
have greater power than those of the regulatory agency. Any
firm ruling by the antitrust authority is liable to meet with
significant political opposition in the country. The proposals for
reform contained herein are designed to deal with this prob-
lem, and take some of the regulatory power out of the hands of
sectoral regulators in newly privatizing countries where the
risk of regulatory capture is significant. National antitrust au-
thorities in developing countries need to be able to point to
some external set of rulings or decisions that will enable them
to escape the political pressure of powerful vested interest
groups, and properly perform their functions. A significant part
of these functions, we argue, is the dismantling of the very
public sector restraints which have held these countries' eco-
nomic development back in the past.
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
We confine our recommendations to the context of the
integration process in Latin America and the Caribbean, both
internally and with reference to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) negotiations. All references to non-national
markets are therefore meant to refer to the FTAA market.
These concepts might be transferable, however, to other region-
al trade areas, encompassing emerging or developing country
markets.
We think there should be some form of institutionalized
process as part of the competition chapter of the FTAA, which
would collectively review decisions, publish guidelines, and
issue non-binding directives. We advocate a gradual approach,
adding areas of competence to this process as they can be
agreed upon. However, there are some areas which could be
agreed to immediately, and these areas should be dealt with
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promptly.
While leaving the interpretation of substantive antitrust
laws to local agencies, some level of supervening competition
rule or general principle, at a regional level, could be useful in
making illegal, for example, the following acts or practices:
1. collusive activity between private entities in member
countries that injures competition in the national mar-
ket of a particular member country or the FTAA market
as a whole;
2. attempts to monopolize or abuse a dominant position by
an entity in a national market or in the FTAA market as
a whole
3. national measures that unfairly discriminate against
persons or entities from outside the member country;
4. state aids to domestic persons or entities that injure or
threaten to injure competition in the member countries
or that operate in a way which adversely affects trade
between member countries; and
5. taxes on the products of other countries in excess of
those imposed, directly or indirectly, on similar domestic
products.
These acts or practices are given as examples. Others may
also be needed. We do believe that they would be a useful
starting point, and would quickly put in place mechanisms and
disciplines that could be used to alleviate the damage caused
by discriminatory laws. At a time of rapid trade and capital
flows, the damage done to free movement of goods and capital
by such laws cannot be understated. Without overstating its
importance, competition policy provides some of the answers.
We advocate that language should be included in any regional
trade agreement which includes competition provisions to spe-
cifically prohibit the behavior referred to above, and some form
of regional process in which all national antitrust agencies
have a part. Such a process should have credibility and real
teeth, to ensure that the influence of powerful domestic lobbies
is counterbalanced for the ultimate benefit of consumers in the
regional area.
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